Canales News Briefs

October 10, 2006

"...Now on the fourteenth the U-2 plane returned from its mission.

The negatives went swiftly to the processing laboratories, then

to the interpretation center, where specialists pored over the

blown-up photographs frame by frame. Late Monday afternoon,

reading the obscure and intricate markings, they identified a

launching pad, a series of buildings for ballistic missiles and

even one missile on the ground of San Cristobal.

3. The Executive Committee

About 8:30 that evening the CIA informed Bundy of the incredible

discovery. Bundy reflected on whether to inform the President

immediately, but he knew that Kennedy would demand the photo-

graphs and supporting interpretation in order to be sure the report

was right and knew also it would take all night to prepare the evi-

dence in proper form. Furthermore, an immediate meeting would

collect officials from dinner parties all over town, signal Washing-

ton that something was up and end any hope of secrecy. It was

better, Bundy thought, to let the President have a night's sleep

in preparation for the ordeal ahead.

The President was having breakfast in his dressing gown at eight

forty-five on Tuesday morning when Bundy brought the news.

Kennedy asked at once about the nature of the evidence. As soon

as he was convinced that it was conclusive, he said that the

United States must bring the threat to an end: one way or another

the missiles would have to be removed. He then directed Bundy

to institute low-level photographic flights and to set up a meeting

of top officials. Privately he was furious: if Khrushchev could pull

this after all his protestations and denials, how could he ever be

trusted on anything?...

...In the Executive Committee consideration was free, intent and

continuous. Discussion ranged widely, as it had to in a situation

of such exceptional urgency, novelty and difficulty. When the

presence of the President seemed by virtue of the solemnity of

his office to have a constraining effect, preliminary meetings

were held without him. Every alternative was laid on the table for

examination, from living with the missiles to taking them out by

surprise attack, from making the issue with Castro to making it

with Khrushchev. In effect, the members walked around the

problem, inspecting it first from this angle, then from that,

viewing it in a variety of perspectives. In the course of the long

hours of thinking aloud, hearing new arguments, entertaining

new considerations, they almost all found themselves moving

from one position to another. ' If we had had to act on Wednesday

in the first twenty-four hours,' the President said later, ' I don't think

probably we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did.'

They had, it was estimated, about ten days before the missiles

would be on pads ready for firing. The deadline defined the

strategy. It meant that the response could not, for example, be

confided to the United Nations, where the Soviet delegate would

have ample opportunity to stall action until the nuclear weapons

were in place and on target. It meant that we could not even risk

the delay involved in consulting our allies. It meant that the total

responsibility had to fall on the United States and its President..."

-Excerpts from "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy

In The White House", by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,

and his observations of the Kennedy Administration

during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962

(And a Midterm Election Year, at that).

"...U.S. intelligence agencies say, based on preliminary indications,

that North Korea did not produce its first nuclear blast yesterday...

.....' There was a seismic even that registered about 4 on the Richter

scale, but it still isn't clear if it was a nuclear test. You can get that

kind of seismic reading from high explosives.' ...

... The underground explosion, which Pyongyang dubbed a historic

nuclear test, is thought to have been the equivalent of several

hundred tons of TNT, far short of the several thousand tons of

TNT, or kilotons, that are signs of a nuclear blast, the official said..."

-Excerpts from an article by Bill Gertz, top

military and intelligence affairs reporter to

the Washington Times, on October 9, 2006.

"...The United States has an estimated 1,120 tactical nuclear warheads,

most of them stored in the United States, with an additional 150 to

200 stored at ten U.S. military bases in seven countries in Europe.

The Russian arsenal, however, is a much different story. There are

no clear estimates of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons stock-

pile, the numbers of which recently have been estimated from

around 3,500 to as high as 22,000. Joshua Handler estimates in

Chapter 2 that the current Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is 3,380.

However, estimates of the Russian arsenal are based on limited

official information, insufficient data regarding the size of the Soviet

TNW arsenal at its peak, and ongoing absence of verification

mechanisms. As a consequence, while Handler's number is

perhaps one of the most substantiated, other estimates ranging

from 4,000 to as high as the 10,000 or 20,000 range cannot be

fully discounted. The lack of information about the size of the

Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal raises uncertainties

regarding the security of the storage of these weapons as well as

about their protections against accidental, unauthorized, or illicit

use. The lack of information on Russian tactical nuclear weapons

is a cause for particular concern regarding further progress on

international nonproliferation efforts and in the context of heightened

international terrorism and potential efforts by state and nonstate

actors alike to acquire nuclear weapons capability....

....The nuclear arsenals of other states also warrant close consider-

ation. Countries such as China, India, and Pakistan possess

nuclear weapons that are considered to be, or could be developed

into, tactical nuclear arsenals or, in their current form, used as

tactical nuclear weapons....

...Characteristics Unique to Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Tactical Nuclear weapons, sometimes known interchangeably

as ' battlefield,' ' substrategic,' or ' nonstrategic nuclear weapons,

are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons, and thus

they warrant different consideration in international security and

in nuclear arms control. In addition to a variety of methods for

TNW delivery that are often distinct from strategic nuclear

weapons delivery vehicles, this category of nuclear weapons

includes a broader array of atomic explosive devices. These

range from so-called nuclear landmines and nuclear artillery

shells to air-dropped or missile-launched nuclear warheads.

The yield of such weapon ranges is typically, but not necessarily,

lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons. The yield of a tactical

nuclear weapon may range from relatively low- 0.1 kiliton (KT)- to

yields higher than those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki- 10-15 KT, and upwards to 1 megaton. To help put these

yield ranges into perspective, in the kiloton and megaton ranges,

a ton is equivalent to the explosive force of 1 ton of TNT. As a

matter of comparison, a December 2001 article in the National

Journal reported that a relatively small 10 KT detonation

in downtown Washington, D.C., would destroy virtually

everything within a 275-yard radius. Within a half-mile of the

explosion, there would be intense shock and heat, mass fires,

and some survivors in reinforced concrete buildings. Two-thirds

of a mile outside the detonation area there would be severe shock

from the blast, and wood and brick homes would be severely

damaged. Just over a mile from the blast there would be significant

damage to buildings, and only some damage two miles out. The

radioactive fallout, according to the article, would vary according

to wind directions and other weather variables, but the plume of

dispersion would be 18 miles long and 2 miles wide, affecting a

population of approximately 150,000. People outdoors would

receive ' dangerous doses of radiation, but those staying indoors

would greatly lessen their risk.' ....

-Excerpts from the book "Tactical Nuclear

Weapons- Emergent Threats in an

Evolving Security Environment", Edited by

Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar

(Brassey's, April of 2003)

To All,

Perhaps the Russkis should take a headcount of their supply of artillery and mortar shells of the tac nuke variety. One might have disappeared in a yard sale, or perhaps the Boys of Beijing might have "reversed engineered" yet another consumer product for export. But it would seem clear that, given the wide variety of source material on the Internet (Ain't Google grand?), the Intel Weenies of Langley are behind the power curve yet again if they are telling Dubya that the North Korean nuclear test did not cut the mustard.

Of course, the whole event begs this question-- If governments cannot make nuclear arms control work (many of the remaining START I limitations expire or "sunset" between 2008 and 2011), how in heck do they expect to enact small arms controls so that The Bad Guys don't have an advantage over the Law-Abiding at the local level?

Links for some of the references above can be found at:

http://books.google.com/books?id=nugfIWmExa8C&pg=PA5&lpg=PR4&
dq=%22Alexander%22+%22Tactical+Nuclear+Weapons:+Emergent+Threats+in+an+...
%22+&sig=72LpQbQSvDFgNMl5q-wqekiu3co

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20061009-115158-2477r.htm

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2396150,00.html

In other news:

Bandini Alert:

The Lamestreamers over at USAToday/Gallup have come up with yet another in a string of polls designed to do, well, what the Media dreams of day in and day out- Make Nancy Pelosi the Speaker of the House.

Posted over at the USAToday.com website is this little gem of a lead in for their latest polling data-

"...Voters shift toward House Democrats

Poll: Dems gain big lead...

By Jill Lawrence, USA Today..."

But well within the poll are the following gems of enlightenment, in the form of questions to likely and registered voters polled:

"...Part 1:

6. Please tell me whether you think each of the following political

office-holders deserves to be re-elected, or not.

A. The U.S. Representative in your Congressional District

yes, deserves no, does not no opinion

Likely voters

2006 Oct 6-8 59 % 33% 8%

Reg. voters

2006 Oct 6-8 57 % 28% 14%

B. Most members of Congress

yes, deserves no, does not no opinion

Likely voters

2006 Oct-6-8 33 % 57% 9%

Registered voters

2006 Oct 6-8 39% 50% 11%

And then there is this little jewel of a question:

"...5. Please say if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of

these people- or if you have never heard of them.

A. House Democratic Leader, Nancy Pelosi

Favorable Unfavorable Never Heard of No Opinion

2006 Oct 6-8 26% 28% 29% 17%

B. Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert

Favorable Unfavorable Never Heard of No Opinion

2006 Oct 6-8 27% 36% 23% 13%............"

In other words, Pelosi has only a 26% favorable rating from a poll that also shows Speaker Hastert with a favorable rating of 27%. And after a week of being hammered, Dennis Hastert has "unfavorables" some 10% lower than the President. (Note to Denny- Don't Quit Your Day Job.).

USAToday/Gallup also explains the following methodology at the very end of the poll (The place where the real numbers are posted)-

"...Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,007 National Adults, aged 18+, conducted October 6-8, 2006. For results based on the total sample of National Adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of sampling error is +/- 3 percentage points....

...For results based on the sample of 915 registered voters, the maximum margin of sampling error is +/- 4 percentage points...

.....Likely voter results are based on the subsample of 622 survey respondents deemed most likely to vote in the November 2006 Mid-term Elections, according to a series of questions measuring current voting intentions and past voting behavior. For results based on the total sample of likely voters, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of sampling error is +/- 5 percentage points. Based on past voting history in United States midterm elections, turnout is assumed to be 40% of the voting age population...".

In other words, the sample size that means something to people with even a minor knowledge of political campaigns is 622, with a sampling error of +/- 5%. Everyone else is like those hapless folks Jay Leno catches out on Melrose Avenue, or that Sean Hannity catches in the clueless streets of New York, who know more about "Brangelina" than anything else. It is on numbers like these that USAToday's so-called "credibility" as an "unbiased" news organization rests.

And what is more, 59% of those likely voters who responded say that they think that "their" Congressman deserves to be re-elected (Looks like Tip O'Neill was right again- All Politics Is Local). Maybe, perhaps if she hurries, Ms. Pelosi can get that deposit back on the new drapes she had ordered for Speaker Hastert's office.

How USAToday/Gallup can hint that this weekend poll is indicative of a tidal wave of change, given other such factors as the economy and the price of fuel, is beyond the ken of this poster. Perhaps Jill Lawrence, Keith Olbermann, and the rest of the Blue State Media types think that they can shout until they are, well...blue in the face so as to pull the Mother of All Scams on the electorate at large. But something tells this poster that, when it is all said and done, there are going to be some long faces over at the DCCC and Dean Central at the end of the evening. Stay tuned.

Link at:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-09-poll_x.htm

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/us/politics/09conservatives.html?ei=5090&
en=c1f50470c9270cce&ex=1318046400&partner=rssuserland&
emc=rss&pagewanted=print

Other Numbers To Ponder By Election Day:

Dow Jones Industrial:

Election Day 2004- 10,557

October 9, 2006- 11,857,81

Federal Unemployment Rate:

Average through 2004- 5.5%

Average through 2005- 5.1%

Average 2006 through Sep- 4.6%

State of California Unemployment Rate: